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1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 99-1, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities
Dear Mr. Allen:
The Investment Company Institute1 appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
Independence Standards Board's proposed standard on audits of mutual funds and related 
entities. The proposal is intended to provide standards by which the independence of the audit 
firm and its partners and employees from mutual fund complexes may be established. The 
primary issues addressed are whether (a) investments by partners of an audit firm in non-client 
funds within a mutual fund complex, or (b) investments through an employee benefit plan by 
the spouses and dependents of such partners in client mutual funds create conflicting interests 
that compromise the credibility of the auditor's reports on the financial statements of the fund.
1 The Investment Company Institute is the national association of the American investment 
company industry. Its membership includes 7,729 open-end investment companies ("mutual funds”), 485 
closed-end investment companies and 8 sponsors of unit investment trusts. Its mutual fund members 
have assets of about $6,010 trillion, accounting for approximately 95% of total industry assets, and have 
over 73 million individual shareholders.
2 Approximately 29 million households—representing 27.9 percent of U-S. households—and 39.9
million individuals owned stock mutual funds inside employer-sponsored retirement plans in 1999.
It is critically important that the investing public maintain confidence in the 
independence of independent auditors. Public confidence would be impaired by evidence that 
independence was actually lacking, and it may also be impaired by the existence of 
circumstances that reasonable people might believe likely to influence or compromise 
independence. At the same time, independence standards should not preclude investment in 
mutual funds where there are no real or perceived conflicts of interest. To do so would deprive 
numerous individuals associated with audit firms and their spouses of the opportunity to invest 
and save for their retirement2 to the detriment of the profession. Further, unduly restrictive 
independence standards may limit the ability of an investment company complex to readily 
obtain auditing services for funds that it manages.
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The Institute believes the proposed approach, barring "on the engagement" investment 
in non-client sister funds, adequately addresses any independence concerns, and at the same 
time, avoids unnecessarily restricting the investment and retirement planning options of audit 
firm employees. However, we believe that the extent to which partners' spouses may invest in 
client funds can be increased without compromising independence. Further, we believe 
independence rules applicable to audits of mutual funds should incorporate grace periods and 
materiality thresholds so as to avoid inadvertent violations attributable to employee 
"transitions" and de minimis holdings. Our specific comments on these points follow, along with 
our response to one of the specific questions set forth in the exposure draft
Spousal/Dependent Investment in Mutual Funds
Existing rules prohibit partners' spouses and dependents from investing in mutual 
funds that are audit clients of the firm. These rules prohibit both direct investment and 
investment through 401(k) or other qualified retirement plans. Further, these rules apply 
irrespective of whether the partner has any involvement in the audit of the mutual fund client.
The proposal would permit a spouse, cohabitant or dependent of a partner not on the 
engagement team, not in its chain of command, and not in an office participating in a significant 
portion of the engagement, to invest in audit client funds through an employer-sponsored 
benefit plan. We support this proposal as far as it goes, but believe it should be expanded.
First, spouses and dependents of partners not on the engagement team, not in its chain 
of command, and not in an office participating in a significant portion of the engagement 
should be permitted to invest directly in audit client funds in addition to investments 
through employer-sponsored benefit plans). The spouse of a partner not on the engagement 
team has no influence over the planning, performance or outcome of an audit. Further, we see 
no public perception problem where the partner is employed in a separate office that does not 
participate in the engagement. Finally, we note that balances in employer-sponsored benefit 
plans may comprise the majority of an individual's accumulated financial wealth. Permitting 
spouses of partners to invest in audit client funds through employer-sponsored benefit plans, 
while prohibiting direct investment, appears inconsistent.
Second, spouses of partners that participate in the engagement, that are in the chain of 
command or are located in an office participating in the engagement should also be permitted 
to invest in audit client funds through employer-sponsored benefit plans. As noted in the 
exposure draft, employer sponsored benefit plans, especially 401(k) plans, have become much 
more common. Many such plans offer a selection of mutual funds sponsored by a particular 
investment company complex. Under the proposal, spouses of the aforementioned partners 
would be prohibited from investing in audit client funds. As a result, the spouse may lose tax 
deferral benefits and employer matching contributions in situations where audit client funds 
are the only available investment options. As noted above, spouses of partners have no 
influence over the planning, performance or outcome of an audit Further, we see no public 
perception problem, so long as investment in the client fund is made through an employer- 
sponsored benefit plan.
If the ISB is unwilling to permit spouses of "on the engagement" partners to invest in 
audit-client funds through employer-sponsored benefit plans, it should at least consider 
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allowing spouses of partners in the engagement office who do no work on the engagement to 
invest in these funds. For example, the spouse of a tax or consulting partner that works in the 
engagement office, but does no work on the audit engagement, should be permitted to invest in 
audit-client funds through his/her employer's retirement plan. Proscribing investment in audit­
client funds by these spouses is unnecessarily restrictive since the partner does not participate 
in the audit engagement, and would not be in a position to influence the audit opinion.
Grace Periods and Materiality Thresholds
Independence rules applicable to fund audits should incorporate grace periods and 
materiality thresholds so that temporary or de minimis violations will not disqualify auditors or 
call into question the validity of previously issued audit opinions. Employee transitions (e.g., 
transfer into an engagement office, admission to the partnership, marriage, etc.) may cause audit 
firm employees, and their spouses, to be suddenly subject to independence rules and thereby 
create temporary, inadvertent violations. Independence rules should incorporate reasonable 
grace periods to permit these employees to sell holdings and ensure that temporary violations 
do not disqualify the firm. De minimis violations, in which covered persons own a small 
number of fund shares similarly should not disqualify the firm. It is difficult to conceive of how 
a covered employee could gain any meaningful personal financial advantage through his or her 
relationship with the fund in such circumstances.
QUESTIONS FOR RESPONDENTS
Q2-A. As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the Board believes that the 
investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from the relationship of a parent and 
its subsidiary, as described in paragraph 16. to warrant only the restrictions proposed. Do you agree that 
these relationship differences are substantive enough to support the Board's proposal? Or, do you believe 
that investment advisers have strong enough operating control over, or financial interests relating to, the 
funds they advise to be more like a parent/subsidiary relationship, and therefore require additional 
independence restrictions and, if so, what restrictions do you suggest?
We believe the relationship differences between an investment adviser/mutual fund 
and a parent/subsidiary corporation are substantially different and provide a sound basis for 
the Board's proposal Mutual fund activities are subject to an extensive regime of substantive 
regulation that goes far beyond the disclosure and anti-fraud provisions characteristic of most 
federal securities laws. The Investment Company Act of 1940, often called the most complex 
SEC statute, imposes restrictions not only on mutual funds, but also on their investment 
advisers, principal underwriters, directors, officers and employees. The 1940 Act contains 
specific prohibitions against certain transactions between a fund and its investment adviser and 
other affiliated persons. These provisions are designed to minimize the potential for the adviser 
and its affiliates to place their own interests ahead of fund shareholders. For example, a fund's 
investment adviser, or any affiliated person, may not knowingly sell to or buy from that fund 
any security or other property, nor may they borrow money or any other property from the 
fund.
Fund directors serve as watchdogs for shareholders' interests and provide a check on the 
adviser and other persons closely affiliated with the fund. The 1940 Act requires that a 
specified percentage of the fund's board of directors be persons who are independent of the 
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fund's investment adviser. The 1940 Act rigorously defines independence through die concepts 
of "affiliated person" and "interested person" so as to ensure that the fund's affairs are 
supervised by independent directors who have no other business or family relationships with 
the fund's investment adviser. The SEC recently issued a series of rule proposals designed to 
further strengthen the role of fund directors.3
If you have any questions on our comments or would like to discuss them further, 
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We appreciate the opportunity to comment on ED 99-1, Certain Independence Implications of 
Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities. Our comments on the specific questions raised in the 
Exposure Draft are as follows:
1. The Board's proposal, which proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds by 
an expanded "on the engagement" group and all partners and managerial employees in 
offices participating in a significant portion of the audit, is more restrictive than 
necessary when considering the threats to independence. While we support restrictions 
on the engagement team and certain individuals in the chain of command, in our view, 
the threats to independence are negligible when partners or managerial employees in 
the offices participating in a significant portion of the audit have investments in non­
audit sister funds.
Engagement teams often obtain information during the course of an audit that could 
impact another company in which individuals in the office have direct investments. For 
example, the auditor may learn that its client, a retailer, plans to change a major vendor, 
which is a non-audit client Although individuals with investments in this non-audit 
client may be adversely affected if the retailer is a significant customer of the vendor, 
such knowledge would not require the auditor to be independent of the non-audit client. 
The situation with respect to sister funds is similar.
Given the size of many offices and the structure of the firms, it is highly unlikely that the 
audit engagement team will know all the partners in the office, and certainly will not 
know all the managerial employees. The first two bullet points in paragraph 5 assume 
the auditor not only knows this group of individuals but also has knowledge of their 
investments. Even in small offices, the threats are minimal and where such threats exist, 
we would suggest they be mitigated using a safeguards approach. Thus, we would limit 
the scope of the independence restrictions to the audit engagement team and the chain 






We concur that an individual in the engagement team's chain of command should be 
prohibited from investing in sister funds. However, we suggest that the definition of the 
term "chain of command" be modified. As written, it includes "all successively senior 
levels." Read literally, the chain might consist of the Audit Division Head, the Office 
Managing Partner, the Country Managing Partner, the Regional Managing Partner, the 
Area Managing Partner and the Chief Executive Officer, in addition to others who may 
be in successively senior levels. The scope of this definition is broader than is necessary. 
If the definition were to include the individual to whom the audit engagement partner 
reports and the next level, we do not believe there would be a significant threat to 
independence if others above that level held investments in non-audit entities in the 
mutual fund complex.
We agree that the definition of chain of command should include those who provide 
technical or specialized consultation, quality control or other oversight of, the partners 
and staff members involved in the audit. However, the group should be limited to those 
directly involved with or consulted on the engagement. Thus, the chain of command 
should not include all of the individuals in the firm available to provide consultation to 
the partners and staff members involved in the audit. Firms would need to implement 
processes to ensure that those consulted do not have investments in sister funds. 
Alternatively and from a practical standpoint, investments in sister funds by those in 
technical or specialized roles could be allowed without impairing the auditor's 
independence. If consultation occurred with respect to the audit client fund, the expert 
would then be prohibited from trading, but not holding, investments in sister funds 
during the period of the consultation and for some period thereafter.
2.A. We agree that the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser is
sufficiently different than the relationship between a parent and subsidiary.
2.B.  We agree with the Board's conclusion that the independence restrictions should be
based solely on the presence of common investment advisers. In our view, there is no 
threat to independence in the case of other common service providers.
3. If the independence restrictions are limited to the audit engagement team and its chain 
of command as discussed in our response to Question 1, we agree that such individuals 
should be independent of all related non-client funds in the complex if they audit a 
related non-fund entity. With respect to funds outside the mutual fund complex, the 
audit engagement team and its chain of command, as defined above, should be 






The appropriateness of the requirement that the audit engagement team be independent 
of a sub-adviser depends on the particular facts and circumstances. If, for example, a 
sub-adviser is a consultant to the investment adviser, and it is the investment adviser 
who has the management contract with the fund, the audit engagement team would not 
need to be independent of the sub-adviser. Conversely, if the sub-adviser has entered 
into a management agreement with the fund, the sub-adviser should be treated as the 
investment adviser.
If the independence restrictions are limited to the audit engagement team and its chain 
of command as discussed in our response to Question 1, we agree that such individuals 
should be independent of all related non-fund entities in the complex if they audit a 
related fund entity. If the investment adviser is outside the mutual fund complex, we 
believe the audit engagement team and its chain of command, as defined above, should 
be independent of the investment adviser and its parent if the investment adviser is 
material to the parent.
4. We agree with the reasoning in paragraph 18 that a distinction exists between defined 
benefit plans and defined contribution plans. This distinction is an appropriate basis for 
the difference in treatment in the proposed rules.
5. We strongly concur with the conclusion of the Board that spouses and dependents of 
partners (other than of the engagement team, its chain of command and in a work office) 
should be allowed to invest, through an employer-sponsored benefit plan, in mutual 
funds that are audit clients because the threat to independence is sufficiently remote. 
Materiality to the partner should not result in a different conclusion.
We urge that the rule permit spouses of partners and managerial employees in the 
office, other than the engagement team and chain of command as defined above, to 
invest in mutual fund audit clients in those cases where (1) all similarly situated 
employees may participate in the employer-sponsored benefit plan, and (2) the 
employer's plan provides no alternative investments, or the only alternative investments 
are money market funds or government securities. If the rule were to permit 
investments in mutual fund audit clients in these cases, the investments should only be 
permitted to the extent the spouse or dependent does not have the right of possession. 
We agree with AICPA Ethics Ruling 108 that a right of possession is not deemed to exist 
if a significant penalty will be incurred upon the withdrawal of the investment from the 
employer-sponsored plan. If the right of possession docs not exist, the materiality of the 
investment to the partner, his or her spouse and dependents is irrelevant, provided the 





6. We agree that the costs (i.e., the threats to independence) of implementing the proposed 
standard are modest and the benefits of limiting the independence restrictions to those 
situations creating risk are significant The proposed standard is an important step 
forward in revising certain of the independence rules that we believe are outdated and 
overly restrictive. As noted in our responses above, we believe that certain 
modifications to the proposed standard should be made. These revisions would not 
materially threaten the auditor's independence, and the benefits of such revisions would 
far outweigh the costs.
7. We are not aware of relevant research and do not suggest that any be commissioned.
Although you sought the above responses to specific questions, we have an additional comment 
on ED 99-1 for your consideration. Paragraph 11 provides that "the auditing firm would not be 
considered independent of any entity within the mutual fund complex if the partners in the 
firm, either individually or collectively, have significant influence over any entity in that 
complex." We suggest that this rule be deleted because paragraph 12, modified as discussed 
above, adequately addresses the threats to independence. However, if the Board concludes that 
such a standard is necessary, the standard should apply only in those cases where the firm 
knows or could reasonably be expected to know that the partner or partners collectively have 
control over an entity in the complex.
* * * * *
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on ED 99-1 and would be pleased to discuss our 
comments with the Board or its staff. Please contact Charles A. Horstmann at (312) 507-3071 or 
Jean L. Rothbarth at (312) 507-2827 with any questions.
Sincerely,
TOTAL P.05






1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel:
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
Independence Standards Board’s (ISB or Board) Exposure Draft (ED) 99-1, Certain 
Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities. We 
commend the Board for its timely efforts in addressing this subject.
The comments in this letter have been developed from the perspective of our firm as an 
ISB constituent. As you know, PwC’s chief executive officer, James J. Schiro, is a 
member of the ISB. In carrying out his responsibilities as a board member, Mr. Schiro 
intends to fully exercise objectivity with a view to helping the ISB to reach conclusions 
on this project that are in the best interests of independence standard-setting and the 
investing public. The comments in this letter have been developed consistent with that 
goal but should not be viewed as necessarily indicative of Mr. Schiro’s personal views 
and do not serve to bind him to any particular thought process in his role as an ISB 
member.
Overview
We believe the Board’s proposal is a step in the right direction as it attempts to establish 
independence requirements in response to the potential threats to independence that could 
arise when auditing mutual funds and related entities. We fully support an approach to 
establishing standards based on an assessment of risks and threats. On that basis, 
however, certain provisions of the ED go farther than we believe is necessary to 
adequately address the threats to independence that may arise when individuals in the 
audit firm invest in non-client sister funds or related non-client entities, We comment on 
those provisions in this letter, and suggest alternatives based on how we believe a 
reasonable investor would perceive the threats related to those situations.
Questions for which Comments are Requested
Below are our responses to the specific questions for which the ISB has requested 
comments.
NOV. '. 1999 11:00PM NO. 083 3 P. 3/11PWC
Mr. Arthur Siegel 
Independence Standards Board 
Page 2 of 10
1. The Board's proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds by
an expanded “on the engagement" group, in addition to all partners and managerial 
employees in offices participating in a significant portion of the audit. As a result, the 
proposal will permit investments in such other funds by all other partners. Is this 
proposal appropriate, too restrictive, or not restrictive enough? Please provide the basis 
for your views, including the applicable threats to independence.
We believe that the proposal is too restrictive. In our view, it is unnecessary to preclude 
all of the partners and managerial employees located in offices participating in a 
significant portion of the audit of a fund from investing in non-client sister funds. Unless 
the partner or manager is providing the fund audit team with consultation or supervision, 
they would have no ability to influence the fund audit team’s decisions, for example, with 
regard to a systemic problem, and therefore no ability to impact their own investment in a 
non-client sister fund. A threat to independence occurs when a partner or manager has an 
ability to control or influence the outcome of an audit and has an incentive to do so. We 
believe this threat is sufficiently mitigated by imposing restrictions on the engagement 
team and certain others (discussed below).
Particularly in large firms, with hundreds of partners and multiple disciplines, it is 
difficult to comprehend how partners or managers not involved in the fund audit either 
directly or indirectly can pose significant threats to a firm’s independence by investing in 
a non-client sister fund. For example, a partner specializing in the high technology 
industry who is not part of the chain of command may be located in an office that 
performs a significant portion of the audit of a mutual fund. Because the partner only 
serves “high-tech” clients, he does not have any interaction with the mutual fund audit 
team and does not provide the team with consultation or supervision. Under such 
conditions, there is little (if any) threat to the firm’s independence as a result of the high- 
tech partner’s investment in a non-client sister fund because the partner’s ability to 
influence the fund audit is, at best, remote. Moreover, because the partner is not in a 
position to control or influence members of the fund audit team, particularly the audit 
partner, we see no reason for the audit team to purposely make audit decisions to benefit 
him.
Based on how we believe a threat to independence occurs, the “chain of command” 
definition should be revised. It should be limited to individuals who have an ability to 
control or influence the audit partner. Generally, we believe this would be the partner’s 
direct superior(s) for purposes of a specific client engagement but may include others, 
depending on the facts and circumstances.
Other individuals should be required to be independent if they are consulted on technical 
or industry specific matters pertaining to a specific client. These would be individuals 
within a firm who are actively sought out for advice and counsel with respect to a specific 
client-related matter. However, a blanket restriction on investing in non-client sister 
funds (or non-client non-fund entities) should not be imposed on these individuals just
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because they might be called upon to assist an audit team by rendering “technical or 
industry specialized consultation.” Instead, we recommend that the Board incorporate 
the recusal provisions set forth in the proposal in ITC 99-1, Family Relationships 
Between the Auditor and the Audit Client, and require those individuals to recuse 
themselves from any such consultation if they have a disqualifying investment. This is 
particularly relevant to larger accounting firms where there are numerous technical or 
industry consultants available who can be called on at any time for any client situation to 
lend their expertise to the audit team. To restrict those individuals from investing in non- 
client sister funds because in the future they may be asked to consult with engagement 
team members in connection with the audit of client funds in the same fund complex is 
unnecessary because there is no independence threat in these situations unless the 
individual is providing service to the engagement team.
2a. As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the Board believes 
that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from the 
relationship of a parent and its subsidiary, as described in paragraph 16, to warrant only 
the restrictions proposed. Do you agree that these relationship differences are 
substantive enough to support the Board's proposal? Or, do you believe that the 
investment advisers have strong enough operating control over, or financial interests 
relating to, the funds they advise to be more like a parent/subsidiary relationship, and 
therefore require additional independence restrictions and, if so, what restrictions do you 
suggest?
We agree that there are differences between an investment adviser/mutual fund 
relationship and a parent/subsidiary relationship and that the differences are substantive 
enough to warrant different independence rules for each relationship. In addition to the 
differences noted in paragraph 16 is the important role that independent directors of a 
fund play in fund governance. For example, the investment adviser has a contract with 
the fund and the independent directors of the fund are required to annually review that 
contract and determine whether to continue to retain the adviser. A decision to terminate 
rhe adviser can be executed by the fund’s board by giving 60 day’s notice to the adviser. 
Other significant related party transactions, to the extent permitted by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, generally require the approval or oversight of the independent 
directors. There are generally no similar indicia of independence between a subsidiary 
and its parent.
2b. As described in paragraph 17, rhe Board concluded that the commonality of an 
investment adviser among funds was of primary importance in analyzing the sister fund 
issue, believing that the limited independence threats envisioned are appropriately 
addressed in the proposed restrictions. Do you instead believe even if the investment 
advisers are different, if other common services are utilized, that the additional 
independence restrictions should be required and, if so, why, and what restrictions do 
you suggest?
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We do not believe that additional restrictions should be imposed because of the 
utilization of other common service providers, as the threat to independence from their 
use appears minimal. We do believe that the commonality of an investment adviser is a 
factor to consider in addressing the sister fund issue. In this regard, however, we think 
the proposed definition of “mutual fund complex” includes more entities than most 
investors would reasonably expect. We suggest the Board consider defining a mutual 
fund complex similar to the definition of “Family of Investment Companies,” which is 
contained in the instructions to Form N-SAR. Under that definition, two or more funds 
that share the same investment adviser and hold themselves out to investors as related for 
investment purposes would be considered a family of funds.
3. The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 12 address 
extending restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex for certain fund/adviser 
relationships. Do you believe these extensions are warranted and extend to the 
appropriate levels?
Proposed Standard (paragraph 12)
We would not object to the third bullet in paragraph 121 provided that the individuals 
required to be independent are those outlined in our response to Question 1 above. We do 
not agree with the fourth bullet in paragraph 122 to the extent it requires independence of 
non-client funds when a firm is auditing a related entity, other than the fund’s investment 
adviser. Independence might be threatened if a firm is auditing ah investment adviser 
while certain individuals hold investments in mutual funds advised by the adviser. 
However, we believe this threat does not exist when the firm is auditing any other related 
entity, such as those listed in the organization chart in Appendix A of the ED, e.g., the 
venture capital entity or the insurance company. Each of the entities listed in that chart 
represent businesses that are separate and distinct from the mutual funds. Given that fact 
and the independent manner in which funds operate (refer to our response to Question 2a) 
it is difficult to comprehend what the independence threat would be if an auditor of the 
venture capital entity had an investment in a non-client fund. Accordingly, we believe 
the provision in this bullet goes beyond what is necessary to preserve the auditor’s 
independence with respect to the audit of the non-fund entity.
1 The third bullet in paragraph 12 reads “a fun , must be independent of all sister funds."
2 The fourth bullet in paragraph 12 reads “a related non-fund entity, must be independent of all related non-client 
funds—that is, all funds in the complex.”
3 The fifth bullet in paragraph 12 reads "one or more funds, must be independent of all related non-fund entities in the 
mutual fund complex.”
We have similar concerns about the fifth bullet in paragraph 123. That provision requires 
independence of all related non-fund entities when auditing one or more funds in the fund 
complex. However, none of the threats described in paragraph 5 would seem to be 
present in that situation and we are unclear as to why this provision is necessary. How is 
the independence of an auditor of a mutual fund threatened when the individuals who 
must be independent of those funds have an investment in, for example, the non-client
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venture capital entity or have a brokerage account with the non-client broker/dealer? 
Other than requiring independence of the investment advisor of the audit client funds, we 
do not see a need for independence to be maintained of the related non-fund entities. 
(See our comments on page 6 regarding independence requirements of non-client 
parents.)
Investment Adviser versus Sub-Adviser4
4 Different fund groups may use different names to refer to an investment adviser and a sub-adviser. For example, the 
former might be referred to as an "investment manager" and the latter as an "investment adviser.”
We do not support the notion that an investment adviser and a sub-adviser should be 
treated the same for independence purposes. While there can be unique arrangements 
involving investment advisers and sub-advisers, we believe the comments that follow 
apply to most investment adviser and sub-adviser situations.
Investment Adviser
An investment adviser typically has two responsibilities with respect to the funds 
it manages: (1) executive management, and (2) portfolio management. Executive 
management involves the overall responsibility for managing the business affairs 
of the fund, subject to the general supervision of the fund’s board. This includes 
selection and oversight of all service providers to the fund (in some instances, 
subject to board approval) and, either directly or through an administrator, 
responsibility for the preparation of the financial statements of the fund. Portfolio 
management involves managing the fund’s portfolio of investments in accordance 
with the fund’s stated policies. Although a single adviser often performs both 
functions, the portfolio management function may be subcontracted, partially or 
wholly, to a separate service provider, i.e., a sub-adviser.
Sub-Adviser
A sub-adviser is typically an entity that picks the securities that a fund invests in. 
Its role is usually limited to portfolio management, which it carries out under the 
oversight of the investment adviser, and it is generally identified and 
subcontracted by the investment adviser. Unlike an investment adviser, a sub­
adviser does not sponsor the fund, does not assume overall management 
responsibilities for the fund, and has considerably less influence than an 
investment adviser over matters outside of its designated area of responsibility. 
For example, although some sub-advisers may assist the investment adviser in 
valuing thinly-traded fund assets, sub-advisers generally have little influence over 
the valuation of the fund’s assets, typically have no significant influence over the 
fund’s overall financial operations or its financial reporting, and would generally 
have no say in the hiring of other service providers for the fund. Further, the 
investment adviser exercises extensive oversight with respect to the sub-adviser 
and participates, via recommendations to the fund’s board, in the decision of
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whether the sub-adviser should be retained or terminated by the fund5. We view 
sub-advisers as essentially service providers to a fund who work on behalf of 
investment advisers on a subcontract basis to lend their expertise to the portfolio 
management function.
5 In contrast, we are not aware of any situations in which sub-advisers have the ability to participate in a decision about 
whether co retain the investment adviser.
Sub-Advisers are not Equivalent to Investment Advisers
Because of the differences between an investment adviser and a sub-adviser, we 
believe sub-advisers should not be treated as equivalent to investment advisers 
and that the references to “sub-adviser” should be deleted from footnotes 1 and 2. 
The independence threats identified in paragraph 5, while applicable to an 
investment adviser, are significantly less in our view when considered in relation 
to sub-advisers, especially given the investment adviser’s oversight of the sub­
adviser’s performance and the other factors described above. Moreover, sub­
advisers are more susceptible to change; posing an added burden on clients and 
auditors to continuously monitor every service relationship an adviser may have 
through a subcontract relationship. Any incremental protection that might be 
gained from requiring independence of the non-client funds advised by a client 
sub-adviser would in our view be more likely to be offset by the significant cost 
of monitoring such activity.
Sub-Advisers Outside of a Mutual Fund Complex
Deleting the references to sub-adviser in both footnotes seems particularly 
appropriate with respect to advisers outside of a mutual fund complex. The 
provision in footnote 2 indicates that when a firm audits “one or more funds,” it is 
required to be independent of the funds’ non-client sub-adviser that is outside of 
the mutual fund complex. Additionally, the independence requirement extends to 
the non-client sub-adviser’s parent, if the sub-adviser is material to the parent, and 
“to all other subsidiaries of those covered parent companies.” Because of the 
independent manner in which funds operate, and given the limited role that a sub­
adviser has in the management of a fund, requiring independence of a non-client 
sub-adviser (and possibly its parents and its parents subsidiaries) provides no 
additional protection to the auditor's independence with respect to the audit of 
funds that are advised by the sub-adviser.
Independence of Non-Client Parents
We agree that a materiality test should be applied to determine whether independence 
should be required of a non-client parent of a non-client investment adviser. However, 
we believe the test should be based on a comparison of the audit client fund(s) to rhe non- 
client parent, not on whether the investment adviser is material to the parent. If the 
auditor of the fund(s) had an investment in the non-client parent, independence could be
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threatened if the results of operations of the fund(s) would significantly affect the parent 
(and thus the auditor’s investment in the parent). The auditor in that instance would have 
an ability to influence the value of his investment through the audit decisions he makes 
when auditing the fund(s). Thus, a materiality test should be based on how significant 
the fund(s) is (are) to the parent. In our view, the best measure to determine this would 
be based on revenues. For example, comparing advisory fees paid by the fund(s) to the 
parent’s total revenues would seem to be an appropriate way to measure materiality and 
thus the potential threat to the auditor’s independence. Measuring materiality based on 
whether the investment adviser is material to the parent does not appropriately address 
that threat. Further, it could lead to situations in which an auditor of a single fund whose 
fees are de minimis to the parent would nonetheless be required to be independent of the 
parent because the adviser is material to the parent. Moreover, we see no reason to 
extend the independence requirements to other subsidiaries of those covered parent 
companies. There would be no added independence protection from such a requirement.
4, The Board's proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self-directed
defined contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 401(k) plans) with non-client 
sister fund choices available to all but the engagement team, its chain of command, and 
certain others. Do you believe that the reasons described in paragraph 18 provide an 
appropriate basis for this distinction from direct investments and the firm's defined 
benefit plans (which may not hold such funds)?
We agree that there is a sufficient distinction between the two types of benefit plans to 
justify a different answer for defined contribution plans. However, as described in our 
response to Question 1, we believe that the partners and managerial employees located in 
an office that participates in a significant portion of the audit do not represent a 
significant threat to the firm's independence. Accordingly, we recommend that they, 
along with others who we would exclude from the chain of command, not be precluded 
from investing in sister funds through a firm’s defined contribution plan.
5. The Board's proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, other than of
the engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work, office, to invest through an 
employee benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients. Do you agree that the 
threats to audit quality are sufficiently remote to support this exemption? Would it make 
a difference if the investment grew to an amount that is material to the parent?
While we question whether current practice interprets the existing rules precisely in the 
manner described in paragraph 19, we do agree that the threat to audit quality of 
investments by spouses and dependents in mutual fund audit clients through their 
employers’ benefit plans is minimal at best. Thus, we support the inclusion in the final 
standard of an explicit statement that would allow investments in audit client mutual 
funds through such plans by spouses and dependents of partners, other than those who 
participate on the engagement team and represent its (narrower) chain of command. 
Further, because the threats are minimal and, as paragraph 19 points out, “it is highly- 
unlikely that those who are exempted could influence the audit” we see no reason to
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employ a materiality standard. (Refer to our response to Question 7 regarding the notion 
of a “work office.”)
6. The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard appear to be 
modest, while the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of potential risk, but 
flexible in areas of negligible perceived risk, appears appropriate. Do you agree or 
disagree with this statement, and why? If you disagree, please offer your suggestions for 
change.
We believe a cost/benefit analysis and the establishment of provisions focused on 
potential risks is appropriate. Because a number of provisions in the ED go beyond what 
we believe is necessary to adequately address potential threats, we question whether the 
costs of implementing the standard would be modest. The comments in this letter reflect 
our attempt to further balance the potential threats to independence with factors that serve 
to mitigate such threats and the costs of complying with the standard that would be 
incurred by the auditor and the audit client. The Board may wish to conduct a further 
analysis along these lines and include in the final standard some of the mitigating factors 
inherent in mutual fund audits that would reduce the risks identified in paragraph 5. For 
example, the risk that an auditor may be reluctant to reveal a systemic problem during the 
course of the audit of a fund that would adversely impact a non-client sister fund is 
mitigated by the fact that another independent accountant is engaged to audit the non- 
client fund. And, as we described earlier, the risk that individuals other than those on the 
engagement team and those comprising a narrower chain of command could influence the 
audit is minimal.
7. One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original archival research in the 
development of principles-based independence standards. Are you aware of any relevant 
research, either available or that you suggest be commissioned, on the specific topic of 
auditor independence with respect to mutual funds? If so, please advise us.
We are not aware of any research that has been performed. However, the Board may 
wish to consider commissioning research into the potential threats to independence that 
might arise if partners and managers in a performing office (other than those who are part 
of the engagement team or narrower chain of command) are not precluded from investing 
in non-client sister funds or related non-client entities. Our comments herein reflect our 
general view that a threat to independence occurs when a partner or manager has an 
ability to control or influence the outcome of an audit and has an incentive to do so. We 
believe partners and managers do not obtain that ability just because they happen to be 
located in the performing office.
Further, in today’s firms, particularly the larger ones, operations are conducted on a 
practice unit basis, which may be either service line or industry based. Such units 
represent a sub-division of a firm’s practice within which a team of partners and staff 
operate closely. Personnel assigned to a practice unit will serve clients on a regional and 
sometimes national basis and are not confined to serving clients that are served primarily
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by the “office” they happen to be located in. In fact, they may never serve clients that are 
typically thought of as “’X’ office’s clients.” Thus, while an appropriate safeguard may 
still involve location in an office different than the one that performs the audit (depending 
on the facts and circumstances), we believe that safeguard is enhanced, and can even be 
superseded, when that individual’s practice unit responsibilities effectively distance him 
from the mutual fund audit and the audit team. It may be helpful to the Board to conduct 
research into the structure and operation of a practice unit versus a practice office to gain 




If the Board retains the references in footnotes 1 and 2 to sub-adviser, we recommend 
including a definition in the Glossary of that term. In addition, we have the following 
suggestions.
Mutual funds
We believe unit investment trusts (UIT’s) should not be included in the definition of 
mutual funds. The structure of a UTT is substantially different from that of a mutual fund. 
For example, UITs are not, by statute, “advised;” they are passive portfolios. The UTT 
sponsor may monitor them, but they do not have active investment decision making 
authority. UITs also do not have ongoing operations and there is no board.
Mutual fund complex
Refer to our response to Question 2b.
B. Appendices  
Both of the Appendices should reflect the existence of sub-advisers, especially if the 
Board decides to retain the references in footnotes 1 and 2.
Appendix B
The phrase “and prepares the fund’s financial statements” should be moved from 
Function 2 to Function I as the fund administrator more typically performs this task.
Function 4 should be revised to read “Conceives the fund and markets it to investors.”
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Function 5 should be revised to read “Provides portfolio management services and 
overall executive management of the fund, including (in consultation with the board) 
selection of ocher service providers.”
Function 9 will be potentially confusing to readers who do not understand Rule 17f-2 of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940. Additionally, it would seem that the custodian’s 
affiliation is not relevant to this discussion.
 
We appreciate the opportunity to express our views and would be pleased to discuss them 
with you in detail. If you have any questions, please contact Robert H. Herz (973-236- 
7217), Kenneth E. Dakdduk (212-596-7140), or Arthur W. Tollefson (212-596-8437).
280 Park Avenue 
New York, NY 10017
Telephone 212 909 5400
Fax 212 909 5699
October 29, 1999
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, Sixth Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Sirs:
Invitation to Comment [ED 99-1] 
Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft [ED 99-1]: Certain 
Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities. We have the 
following general comments to supplement our responses to the questions included with 
the exposure draft, which responses are included in the Attachment to this letter.
1. Paragraph 4 of the exposure draft states that previously issued independence 
standards are not changed by the exposure draft except as to paragraph 13. We 
recommend that this paragraph be expanded to provide a general overview of current 
independence standards as they relate to audits of mutual funds. This additional 
background would provide needed perspective on the requirements proposed later in 
the exposure draft as they relate to other entities and defined groups of individuals 
and clarify how paragraph 13 relates to the rest of the document.
2. Paragraph 11 of the exposure draft describes independence requirements with respect 
to partners in a firm either individually or collectively having “significant influence” 
over any entity in a mutual fund complex. We believe that the use of the term 
“significant influence” in this context requires additional explanation and 
clarification. Examples of the types and extent of relationships that would constitute 
significant influence would be helpful.
3. Paragraph 12 extends independence requirements to the audit engagement team and 
its chain of command and the partners and managerial employees in offices 
participating in a significant portion of the audit. The chain of command is defined 
broadly in the glossary of terms in the exposure draft. In the Board’s ITC 99-1 on 
Family Relationships Between the Auditor and the Audit Client the definition of “on 
the engagement” included “Alternative A” and “Alternative B” for comment on how 
far the definition of “on the engagement” should be extended. We believe that 
whenever possible the Board should consistently define the group of individuals to 
which expanded independence requirements apply. To the extent that differing and 
overlapping definitions of “on the engagement” and “ chain of command” are 
established in ISB standards, we believe this may add to confusion on how to apply 
independence standards and inconsistency in application. As noted in our responses, 
we also believe that chain of command should be strictly defined.
4. Paragraph 13 describes a change in current independence rules and as such is a key 
component of the exposure draft. We found the structure of this paragraph awkward 
and confusing. We recommend that the paragraph be rewritten as an affirmative 
statement followed by the exceptions.
5. The definition of “sister funds” in the glossary is confusing in that it is unclear 
whether the fund audited by the firm is limited to those that are part of the complex. 
If so, as we believe was intended, the definition should be “mutual funds in a 
complex with a common investment adviser.” We believe that the definition should 
be limited to those that are part of the complex.
6. Appendix A and B are helpful in illustrating typical mutual complex and fund 
structures. We recommend that additional organizational charts illustrating the 
independence requirements described in paragraph 12 (and related footnotes) be 
added to the final document. We believe that the independence requirements are 




Exposure Draft [ED 99-1] Attachment
Responses to Specific Questions
1) The Board’s proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds by an 
expanded “on the engagement” group, in addition to all partners and managerial 
employees in offices participating in a significant portion of the audit. As a result, the 
proposal will permit investments in such other funds by all other partners. Is this 
proposal appropriate, too restrictive, or not restrictive enough? Please provide the basis 
for your views, including the applicable threats to independence.
We believe that the proposal to proscribe investments in non-audit sister funds by 
the auditing firm, its retirement plans, the audit engagement team and its chain of 
command (appropriately defined) is appropriate. We believe that the partners and 
managers in a participating office who are not on the audit engagement team or 
its chain of command should not be subject to the proscription. We also believe 
that it is appropriate not to expand this proscription to all other partners, because 
we do not believe that there is any realistic threat to a firm’s independence by 
their ability to make such investments.
The audit engagement team’s “chain of command” needs to be defined more 
crisply. We would limit it to those with direct managerial or supervisory 
responsibility and those with formal responsibility for technical support. Broad 
inclusion of “those who provide technical... consultation”, which can include a 
large, shifting population, and those with “other oversight” responsibility, which 
can also include a broad range of middle-management level personnel, creates 
unnecessary administrative burdens and such personnel are not significant 
threats to independence.
2) A) As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the Board 
believes that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from 
the relationship of a parent and its subsidiary as described in paragraph 16, to warrant 
only the restrictions proposed. Do you agree that these relationship differences are 
substantive enough to support the Board’s proposal? Or, do you believe that investment 
advisers have strong enough operating control over, or financial interests relating to the 
funds they advise to be more like a parent/subsidiary relationship, and therefore require 
additional independence restrictions and, if so, what restrictions do you suggest?
B) As described in paragraph 17, the Board concluded that the commonality 
of an investment adviser among funds was of primary importance in analyzing the sister 
fund issue, believing that the limited independence threats envisioned are appropriately 
addressed in the proposed restrictions. Do you instead believe even if the investment 
advisers are different, if other common services are utilized, that additional independence 
restrictions should be required and, if so, why and what restrictions do you suggest?
We believe that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is such as to 
merit the additional restrictions proposed by the Board but not such as to merit 
expanded restrictions consistent with those of a parent/subsidiary relationship.
Exposure Draft [ED 99-1]
Responses to Specific Questions
Attachment
We agree that restrictions should not be extended to other common service 
providers.
3) The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 12 address 
extending restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex for certain fund/adviser 
relationships. Do you believe these extensions are warranted and extend to the 
appropriate levels?
We oppose extending this restriction at the sub-adviser level, because application 
will be unwieldy and the threat to independence is not significant. In addition, it 
seems unusual to introduce the sub-adviser role in a footnote and not in the body 
of the document or in the glossary. Footnote 2 to paragraph 12 appears to apply 
where an investment adviser (assumed to be a company, not an individual) works 
for more than one complex. Our reading of this paragraph would indicate that 
for a firm that audits a fund in one complex, the independence rules would apply 
not only to all related non-fund entities in that complex, but also to non-fund 
entities in other complexes to which the fund adviser is material. What does 
“material ” mean in this context and how could the audit firm obtain the 
information to determine materiality? We believe that Footnote 2 is unwieldy and 
that the threat to independence covered by the footnote is more theoretical than 
real. We also oppose applying this restriction at the sub-adviser level for reasons 
cited above.
4) The Board’s proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self-directed 
defined contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 401(k) plans) with non- 
client sister fund choices available to all but the engagement team, its chain of command, 
and certain others. Do you believe that the reasons described in paragraph 18 provide an 
appropriate basis for this distinction from direct investments and the firm’s defined 
benefit plans (which may not hold such funds)?
We agree with the logic of paragraph 18.
5) The Board’s proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, other than of 
the engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work office, to invest through an 
employee benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients. Do you agree that the 
threats to audit quality are sufficiently remote to support this exemption? Would it make 
a difference if the investment grew to an amount that is material to the partner?
We agree that the threats to audit quality are sufficiently remote to support the 
exemption described in paragraph 13. We do not believe that independence would 
be threatened further if the investment grew to an amount that is material to the 
partner.
6) The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard appear to be 
modest, while the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of potential risk, but 
flexible in areas of negligible perceived risk, appears appropriate. Do you agree or 
Exposure Draft [ED 99-1] Attachment
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disagree with this statement, and why? If you disagree, please offer your suggestions for 
change.
On the whole, we agree with the statement. However, there are areas that could 
result in significant administrative cost. Specifically,
(a) Broad inclusion in the audit engagement team's “chain of command” of 
“those who provide technical... consultation ”, which can include a large, 
shifting population, and those with “other oversight” responsibility, which can 
also include a broad range of middle-management level personnel, creates 
unnecessary administrative burdens and such personnel are not significant 
threats to independence.
(b) Inclusion of sub-advisers in Footnotes 1 and 2 to paragraph 12 and 
extension of the independence restrictions to additional complexes in Footnote 2 
also adds unwarranted administrative complexity. We recommend removing these 
requirements.
7) One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original and archival research in the
development of principles-based independence standards. Are you aware of any relevant 
research, either available or that you suggest be commissioned, on the specific topic of 
auditor independence with respect to mutual funds? If so, please advise us.
We are unaware of any available relevant research and would welcome 
rigorously designed studies to determine whether lack of independence 
restrictions in areas of concern have led to lapses in audit integrity.
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association 
College Retirement Equities Fund
730 Third Avenue/New York, NY 10017-3206 
212 490-9000
Peter C. Clapman
Senior Vice President and 






1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: Exposure Draft (ED 99-1) On Certain Independence 
Implications of Mutual Funds and Related Entities
Dear Sir or Madam:
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities 
Fund ("TIAA-CREF") is pleased to submit comments on the Independence Standards 
Board’s Exposure Draft Regarding Certain Independence Implications of Mutual Funds 
and Related Entities. TIAA-CREF agrees with the Board that maintaining 
independence of independent auditors is essential in order to serve the public interest 
and promote investor confidence in the securities markets and we support the Board’s 
independence standards. We also agree with the Board that spouses and other 
persons related to partners of auditing firms who have no involvement in the mutual 
fund audit should be permitted to invest in the client mutual fund through employer- 
sponsored retirement plans and, as described below, suggest a slight broadening of 
the proposal.
TIAA is a non-profit stock life insurance company. Its companion 
organization, CREF, is a non-profit corporation registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as an investment company. Together, through the issuance of 
fixed and variable annuity certificates, TIAA-CREF comprises the principal retirement 
system for the nation's education and research communities. TIAA-CREF serves over 
2.1 million people at over 9,300 United States institutions and jointly manages over 
$260 billion in assets. In addition to offering fixed and variable annuities, we offer a 
series of retail and institutional mutual funds which are also registered as investment 
companies with the Commission.
The proposed independence standard would generally impose certain 
restrictions on accounting firms that audit mutual funds and other investment 
companies. The proposed independence standard would, however, permit spouses, 
co-habitants and dependents of partners not on the engagement team, not in its chain 
of command and not in an office participating in a significant portion of the engagement 
to invest in audit client funds through employer-sponsored retirement plans. We fully
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support this proposal because it is highly unlikely that these individuals would be able 
to influence the audit and compromise the independence of the auditing firm with 
respect to any audit since the partner they are related to has no connection to the 
audit. Prohibiting such investments would unnecessarily deprive these individuals of 
the opportunity to save and invest for retirement. We therefore, as a policy matter, 
agree with the Board’s proposal to permit these individuals to participate in their 
employer-sponsored retirement plans which offer a family of mutual funds that are audit 
clients of the auditing firm.
In addition, we believe that the same rationale applies to spouses, co­
habitants and dependents of partners located in an office participating in a significant 
way in the audit but who do not participate in the engagement and are not part of its 
chain of command. It is also extremely unlikely that these individuals would be able to 
influence the audit or create conflicting interests for the firm. Restricting such 
investments, as stated above, would also be a harsh result since these individuals 
could lose important tax-deferral benefits and possibly employer matching contributions 
even though the partner they are related to is not involved in the audit of the mutual 
fund client. Therefore, we believe, as a policy matter, that the standards should be 
modified to also permit investments by such individuals in their employer-sponsored 
retirement plans which offer funds that are audit clients of the firm.
We would be pleased to discuss these comments with you in further detail 
if you believe that would be helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you 






1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 99-1
Gentlemen:
The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit this 
comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 99-1, Certain 
Independence Implications of Mutual Funds and Related Entities.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Exposure Draft, we have the 
following comments:
Q1. The Board’s proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds by 
an expanded "on the engagement" group, in addition to all partners and managerial 
employees in offices participating in a significant portion of the audit. As a result, 
the proposal will permit investments in such other funds by all other partners. Is 
this proposal appropriate, too restrictive, or not restrictive enough? Please provide 
the basis for your views, including the applicable threats to independence.
The audit engagement team is expanded to include its “chain of command”, which is 
defined as “those who supervise or have direct management responsibility for, (including 
all successively senior levels), or provide technical or industry specialized consultation, 
quality control or other oversight of, the partners and staff members involved in the 
audit”. We question whether it is necessary to include all such individuals. For example, 
it would seem that in a large firm’s national office, most personnel would be brought in 
under this definition. It is also unclear whether the chain of command definition includes 
only partners or would those with a managerial position also be included. For example, 
would a national office manager in a quality control function be included in this 
definition? We would recommend that such individuals not be included.
In addition, we also question whether it is necessary to include all partners and 
managerial employees in offices participating in a significant portion of the audit. The 
proposal already covers the engagement team and its chain of command. Accordingly, it 
would appear reasonable that the only incremental professionals that should be included 
are those partners and managers in the office that might reasonably be expected to work 
on mutual fund audits or their related entities (e.g., the firm’s financial services practice 
unit). In other words, we believe that partners and managerial employees who are not in a 
position to influence the audit, should not be subject to these restrictions.
Q2. A. As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the Board 
believes that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different 
from the relationship of a parent and its subsidiary, as described in paragraph 16, 
to warrant only the restrictions proposed. Do you agree that these relationship 
differences are substantive enough to support the Board’s proposal? Or, do you 
believe that investment advisers have strong enough operating control over, or 
financial interests relating to, the funds they advise to be more like a 
parent/subsidiary relationship, and therefore require additional independence 
restrictions and, if so, what restrictions do you suggest?
We agree that the organizational structure of a mutual fund entity, specifically the 
relationship between the investment adviser and the mutual fund, are inherently different 
than that of a parent/subsidiary relationship. Accordingly, we believe that the 
independence restrictions set forth in the proposal are sufficient and appropriately 
restrictive.
B. As described in paragraph 17, the Board concluded that the commonality of an 
investment adviser among funds was of primary importance in analyzing the sister 
fund issue, believing that the limited independence threats envisioned are 
appropriately addressed in the proposed restrictions. Do you instead believe even if 
the investment advisers are different, if other common services are utilized, that 
additional independence restrictions should be required and, if so, why, and what 
restrictions do you suggest?
We agree that the use of common investment advisers is the only potentially relevant 
factor in considering independence as it relates to the sister fund issue. We believe that 
any threats to independence associated with other common service providers are 
insignificant and should not require additional independence restrictions.
Q3. The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 12 address 
extending restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex for certain 
fund/adviser relationships. Do you believe these extensions are warranted and 
extend to the appropriate levels?
We do not see any need to extend the restrictions beyond the original mutual fund 
complex and therefore, recommend that the footnotes be deleted. If the Board decides to 
include the footnotes, we recommend clarification of these additional restrictions.
Q4. The Board’s proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self-directed 
defined contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 401(k) plans) with non- 
client sister fund choices available to all but the engagement team, its chain of 
command, and certain others. Do you believe that the reasons described in 
paragraph 18 provide an appropriate basis for this distinction from direct 
investments and the firm’s defined benefit plans (which may not hold such funds)?
We agree that due to the differences between a defined benefit plan and defined 
contribution plan, the Board’s rationale and proposed restrictions as discussed in 
paragraph 18 are appropriate.
2
Q5. The Board’s proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, other than 
of the engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work office, to invest 
through an employee benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients. Do you 
agree that the threats to audit quality are sufficiently remote to support this 
exemption? Would it make a difference if the investment grew to an amount that is 
material to the partner?
AICPA ethics ruling no. 108 under rule 101, Participation of Member or Spouse in 
Retirement, Savings, or Similar Plan Sponsored by, or That Invests in, Client, provides 
guidance with regard to independence when a member’s spouse participates in an 
employer-sponsored benefit plan that invests in a client. The ruling requires that certain 
conditions must be met in order for the member’s independence not to be impaired. 
Specifically, we have taken the position that the spouse’s investment through the benefit 
plan in a mutual fund audit client is an indirect financial interest and therefore, 
independence would be impaired if the investment in the client was material. If the Board 
adopts a final standard consistent with the proposal, we will reconsider ruling no. 108 to 
determine whether a revision is appropriate.
Q6. The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard appear to be 
modest, while the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of potential risk, 
but flexible in areas of negligible perceived risk, appears appropriate. Do your agree 
or disagree with this statement, and why? If you disagree, please offer your 
suggestions for change.
We agree with this statement and believe that the benefits achieved with implementation 
of the proposed standard outweigh the costs.
Q7. One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original and archival research in the 
development of principles-based independence standards. Are you aware of any 
relevant research, either available or that you suggest be commissioned, on the 
specific topic of auditor independence with respect to mutual funds? If so, please 
advise us.
We are not aware of any research performed in this area.
We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in further 









Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Art:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Independence Standards Board’s (ISB) 
Exposure Draft (ED) on Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds 
and Related Entities (ED 99-1). We do not have specific comments for any changes to 
the exposure draft given its scope limitation to mutual funds.
The IIA believes that the proposal is appropriately restrictive to protect the investing 
public while not imposing restrictions on other plans and individuals where the risks are 
minimal.
Established in 1941, The Institute of Internal Auditors is an international professional 
organization with world headquarters in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The IIA has over 
70,000 members in internal auditing, governance, internal control, IT audit, education, 
and security. With representation from more than 100 countries, The Institute is the 
acknowledged leader in standards, certification, education, research, and technological 
guidance for the profession worldwide.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer our comments on this very challenging issue.
Sincerely,




VEDDER, PRICE. KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ
805 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022-2203
212-407-7700
FACSIMILE. 212-407-7799
A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING VEDDER. PRlCE KAUFMAN & KAMMMOLZ, P.C.
WITH OFFICES IN CHICAGO AND NEW YORK CITY
November 1, 1999
Via Facsimile (212) 596-6137
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor 
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED 99-1
Gentlemen:
I greatly appreciate being given an opportunity to respond to the above-referenced 
Exposure Draft (the “Exposure Draft”) on Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds 
and Related Entities. I applaud the Board’s willingness to unravel the layers of independence 
restrictions in an attempt to make independence standard both more realistic and workable in 
today’s environment. I am concerned, however, that certain portions of the proposal lack clarity. 
Therefore, I suggest that they be better articulated and their rationale’s fully explained. Set forth 
below are my comments with respect to the specific questions raised in the Exposure Draft.
1. I believe the scope of affected persons proposed by the Board represents a good balance 
in that it seems well designed to encompass all persons who might reasonably be expected to 
exert an influence on the performance of the audit and correspondingly eliminates restrictions 
upon those whose influence on the conduct of the audit seems theoretical, at best. The Board 
should not devise its independence standards on the basis of an irrational investor’s most far 
reaching fears.
2 A. 1 concur that the differences between mutual funds and subsidiaries are sufficiently 
substantive to justify the Board’s proposal. Nevertheless, this position would not be appropriate 
for a family of real estate limited partnerships with a common managing or general partner 
because of the tendency of many managing partners to commingle assets and to effect 
transactions between the various limited partnerships under their management.
B. I am unable to understand why investment in one fund managed by a given 
investment advisor should impair the firm’s independence with respect to another fund managed 






indirectly. Thus, as long as other (non-fund) entities within the same family of mutual funds deal 
with both funds on a like basis (not favoring one over the other), there should be no impairment 
of audit independence as a result of an investment by a firm member not involved in the 
engagement.
3. The proposal is in need of clarification as its meaning is anything but clear. In 
particular, what is meant by "significant influence” (as found in paragraph 11) over an entity 
within the fund complex. Equally important, why should even a substantial investment in one 
fund (as opposed to a service company) within a fund complex impair independence with respect 
to other funds within that complex? At the very least, these restrictions, as well as their 
rationales, should be more clearly articulated.
4. The lifting of restrictions on investments by self-directed defined contribution 
plans with respect to investments by others in sister funds seems wholly appropriate as there is 
no way that such investments will either affect the client or influence the conduct of the audit
5. The relaxation of the independence requirements as to spouses and dependents of 
firm members other than members of the engagement team, its chain of command and those of 
partners in the office performing the engagement is wholly appropriate as such individuals are 
sufficiently removed so that they or their investments are not likely to have any influence on the 
client or the audit. I would, however, impose a limit on the magnitude of such investments 
(perhaps no more than 5% of the liquid assets of any such individual and no more than 1% of all 
fund assets by all persons associated with the firm).
6. I agree wholly with the approach taken in the proposal to lift restraints when they 
servo no likely risk to the conduct of an audit. The Board would appear to share my belief that 
"independence” is and must be viewed only as a means of achieving objectivity and integrity in 
the performance of an audit and assuring public confidence in the audit process. Moreover, it is 
only one of many factors that the public considers in assessing the reliability of financial 
statements. Accordingly, it is not an end unto itself which must be maintained at all costs. I am, 
however, concerned that a wholesale relaxation of independence standards could lead to charges 
of insider trading. Therefore, the standard should include a warning that, even though certain 
financial relationships may no longer be deemed to impair audit independence, audit firms will 






7. I am not aware of any existing research in this area. It might be helpful to conduct 
a few focus groups of analysts, bank lending officers and individual investors to test their beliefs 
as to the extent that the credibility of an audit report would be diminished by the proposed 
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1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 99-1
Gentlemen:
Grant Thornton appreciates the opportunity to comment on ED 99-1, Certain 
Independence Implications of Mutual Funds and Related Entities, and commends the 
Independence Standards Board for addressing these important issues in a timely 
fashion.
In general, we support the issuance of the proposed standard. Our specific responses 
with respect to the questions raised in the ED are as follows.
Question 1. The Board’s proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister 
funds by an expanded "on the engagement" group, in addition to all partners and 
managerial employees in offices participating in a significant portion of the audit. 
As a result, the proposal will permit investments in such other funds by all other 
partners. Is this proposal appropriate, too restrictive, or not restrictive enough? 
Please provide the basis for your views, including the applicable threats to 
independence.
Overall, this proposal appears to be reasonable and any potential threat to auditor 
independence would seem minimal. We have some concerns, however, over the 
apparent wide sweeping definition of "chain of command", which is defined as "those 
who supervise or have direct management responsibility for, (including all successively 
senior levels), or provide technical or industry specialized consultation, quality control 
or other oversight of, the partners and staff members involved in the audit."
This definition would appear to include most of the personnel in a large firm's 
national office. We believe that inclusion of the group that "provide technical or 
industry specialized consultation, quality control or other oversight of the partners 
and staff members involved in the audit" is too restrictive. For example, a manager in 
the quality control department of the national office who has little likelihood to work
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on the specific engagement, but may provide technical consultation advice to partners 
and staff on other engagements, would appear to be included in chain of command.
We recommend that the Board consider changing the definition of "chain of 
command" to:
Those who supervise or have direct management responsibility for, (including 
all successively senior levels), or have provided or are likely to provide technical 
or industry specialized consultation specifically relating to the engagement to 
the partners and staff members involved in the engagement.
Question 2A. As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the 
Board believes that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is 
sufficiently different from the relationship of a parent and its subsidiary, as 
described in paragraph 16, to warrant only the restrictions proposed. Do you 
agree that these relationship differences are substantive enough to support the 
Board’s proposal? Or, do you believe that investment advisers have strong 
enough operating control over, or financial interests relating to, the funds they 
advise to be more like a parent/subsidiary relationship, and therefore require 
additional independence restrictions and, if so, what restrictions do you suggest?
We concur with the Board's view that relationship between the investment adviser and 
the mutual fund are substantively different than that of a parent/subsidiary 
relationship and support the Board's proposal.
Question 2B. As described in paragraph 17, the Board concluded that the 
commonality of an investment adviser among funds was of primary importance in 
analyzing the sister fund issue, believing that the limited independence threats 
envisioned are appropriately addressed in the proposed restrictions. Do you 
instead believe even if the investment advisers are different, if other common 
services are utilized, that additional independence restrictions should be required 
and, if so, why, and what restrictions do you suggest?
The use of common investment advisers is the most relevant factor in analyzing threats 
to auditor independence as it relates to the sister fund issue. We believe that any 
threats to independence associated with other common service providers are minimal 
and, accordingly, should not require additional independence restrictions.
Question 3. The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 
12 address extending restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex for 
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certain fund/adviser relationships. Do you believe these extensions are warranted 
and extend to the appropriate levels?
We believe the threats to auditor independence for the relationships specified in the 
footnote 2 to paragraph 12 are minimal, and therefore recommend that the Board 
delete this footnote. If the Board decides to keep this restriction, we recommend both 
footnote 1 and 2 be moved to the body of the standard, which, in our view would 
clarify the requirement.
Question 4. The Board’s proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self­
directed defined contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 401(k) plans) 
with non-client sister fund choices available to all but the engagement team, its 
chain of command, and certain others. Do you believe that the reasons described 
in paragraph 18 provide an appropriate basis for this distinction from direct 
investments and the firm’s defined benefit plans (which may not hold such 
funds)?
We concur with Board's reasons as described in paragraph 18 for the distinction 
between a defined benefit plan and defined contribution plan.
Question 5. The Board’s proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, 
other than of the engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work office, 
to invest through an employee benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients. 
Do you agree that the threats to audit quality are sufficiently remote to support 
this exemption? Would it make a difference if the investment grew to an amount 
that is material to the partner?
While we concur that the threats to independence are sufficiently remote, we do have a 
concern when the amounts become material. We refer the Board to the AICPA's 
Ethics Ruling 108, Participation of Member or Spouse in Retirement, Savings, or Similar 
Plan Sponsored by, or That Invests in, Client, which specifies that the spouse’s 
investment through the benefit plan in a mutual fund audit client would impair 
independence if the investment in the client was material.
Question 6. The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard 
appear to be modest, while the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of 
potential risk, but flexible in areas of negligible perceived risk, appears 
appropriate. Do your agree or disagree with this statement, and why? If you 
disagree, please offer your suggestions for change.
Grant Thornton
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We concur with Board's cost/benefit analysis.
Question 7. One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original and archival research 
in the development of principles-based independence standards. Are you aware of 
any relevant research, either available or that you suggest be commissioned, on 
the specific topic of auditor independence with respect to mutual funds? If so, 
please advise us.
We are not aware of any research in this area.
Other Comment
Paragraph 11 uses the term "significant influence". We are not aware of this term 
being defined in SEC literature. As this is the first time it is used in an ISB document, 
we recommend that the Standard contain a definition. We suggest the Board consider 
adopting the AICPA definition in ET Section 101.11.
* * * * *
We appreciate the opportunity to express our views. If you would like to discuss any 
matter further, please contact Barry Barber, Partner and Executive Director of Global 
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ED 99-1—Comment Letter
Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related 
Entities
We are pleased to submit this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard 
to ED 99-1, “Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related 
Entities.” Due to the unique corporate governance and legal structure of mutual funds and 
mutual fund complexes, it has been determined that separate guidance should be issued with 
regard to independence issues related to mutual fund audits. We are supportive of the Board's 
attempt to develop principles-based standards to better address the threats to auditor 
independence.
We support the Board’s proposal, and are particularly pleased with the Board’s focus on 
extending independence restrictions with respect to non-client entities in a mutual fund complex 
to only those professionals involved in the audit of related entities and those in a position to 
influence the audit. We are also pleased with the Board’s recognition that permitting spouses of 
other professionals to invest in mutual fund audit clients through employee benefit plans is a 
practical good in this changing social environment, and that the risk that such investments will 
adversely affect audit quality appears trivial.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Exposure Draft, we have the following 
comments which include suggestions to further focus the proposed restrictions on the area of 
potential risk:
Q1: The Board’s proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds by an 
expanded “on the engagement” group, in addition to all partners and managerial employees in 
offices participating in a significant portion of the audit. As a result, the proposal will permit 
investments in such other funds by all other partners. Is this proposal appropriate, too restrictive, 
or not restrictive enough? Please provide the basis for your views, including the applicable 
threats to independence.
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We agree that die proposed restrictions on the audit engagement team and its chain of command 
(i.e. those in a position to influence the audit) are reasonable. However, we do not agree that it is 
necessary to expand these restrictions to all partners and managerial employees in offices 
participating in a significant portion of the audit. These professionals by definition would not be 
working on the audit engagement or be in a position to influence the audit. Thus, there appears to 
be little threat posed as a result of these professionals investing in non-client entities through a 
401 (k) plan or otherwise.
Q2: A. As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the Board believes that 
the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from the relationship of a 
parent and its subsidiary, as described in paragraph 16. to warrant only the restrictions proposed. 
Do you agree that these relationship differences arc substantive enough to support the Board's 
proposal? Or, do you believe that investment advisers have strong enough operating control over, 
or financial interests relating to, the funds they advise to be more like a parent/subsidiarv 
relationship, and therefore require additional independence restrictions and, if so. what 
restrictions do you suggest?
B. As described in paragraph 17. the Board concluded that the commonality of an 
investment adviser among funds was of primary importance in analyzing the sister fund issue, 
believing that the limited independence threats envisioned arc appropriately addressed in the 
proposed restrictions. Do you instead believe even if the investment advisers arc different, if 
other common services arc utilized, that additional independence restrictions should be required 
and, if so, why, and what restrictions do you suggest?
We agree that the investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from a 
parent/subsidiary relationship for the reasons expressed in paragraph 16.
We do not believe that different investment advisers utilizing common services should be subject 
to additional independence restrictions for the reasons expressed in paragraph 17.
03: The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 12 address extending 
restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex for certain fund/adviser relationships. Do 
you believe these extensions are warranted and extend to the appropriate levels?
We are in agreement that it is prudent that extensions be made beyond the original mutual fund 
complex in certain situations. However, we do not agree that these restrictions should always 
apply at the sub-adviser level. The proposed rule implies that the members listed in paragraph 12 
would be precluded from investing in all mutual funds advised in a sub-advisory relationship. A 
sub-adviser typically is retained to manage a fund's portfolio and does not have significant 
influence over the fund’s structure and service relationships. The investment adviser retains 
ultimate responsibility for all aspects of the fund. The investment adviser is responsible for
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establishment of the fund, provider selection (including selection of the sub-adviser), and the 
integrity of the financial statements. The sub-adviser, on the other hand, is selected for portfolio 
management and normally is not responsible for fund portfolio accounting, determination of the 
fund’s net asset value, shareholder transactions and recordkeeping, financial statement 
preparation or other aspects of the internal control structure. 1'hercfore, we recommend that if a 
sub-adviser does not perform these functions and has no representatives on the fund’s board of 
dircctors/trustees, the members listed in paragraph 12 should not be precluded from investing in 
such sub-advisers or their related entities. In other words, we would not extend the proposed 
independence restrictions to entities outside the mutual fund complex where the fund complex 
only outsources limited functions to a third party sub-adviser.
04: The Board’s proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self-directed defined
contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 401(k) plans) with non-client sister fund 
choices available to all but the engagement team, its chain of command, and certain others. Do 
you believe that the reasons described in paragraph 18 provide an appropriate basis for this 
distinction from direct investments and the firm’s defined benefit plans (which may not hold 
such funds)?
We believe that the reasons set forth in paragraph 18 provide an appropriate distinction.
05: The Board’s proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, other than of the 
engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work office, to invest through an employee 
benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients. Do you agree that the threats to audit quality 
are sufficiently remote to support this exemption? Would it make a difference if the investment 
grew to an amount that is material to the partner?
Consistent with our comments in response to Question 1 above, we agree that the threats to audit 
quality are sufficiently remote to support the exemption permitting spouses and dependents of 
partners, other than those on the engagement team and in its chain of command (but not 
necessarily those in work office), to invest through an employee benefit plan in mutual funds that 
are audit clients. We believe the explanation of reasons for this proposal in paragraph 18 is 
compelling, and do not believe there should be any materiality limitation for investments made 
as part of an employee benefit plan.
Q6: The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard appear to be modest, 
while the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of potential risk, but flexible in areas 
of negligible perceived risk, appears appropriate. Do your agree or disagree with this statement, 
and why? If you disagree, please offer your suggestions for change.
We believe that the Board should strive to establish standards that are crisply focused on the area 
of potential risk, but flexible in areas of negligible perceived risk, in all of its projects, and
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believe the Board’s proposal accomplishes that objective. However, as noted in our response to 
Question 1 above, we believe there is little threat posed as a result of those professionals not 
working on the audit engagement or in a position to influence the audit investing in non-client 
entities through a 401(k) plan or otherwise.
07. One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original and archival research in the development 
of principles-based independence standards. Are you aware of any relevant research, either 
available or that you suggest be commissioned, on the specific topic of auditor independence 
with respect to mutual funds? If so, please advise us.
We are not aware of any research in this area.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with the Board or its staff.
Sincerely,
 NOV-09-1999 16:26 SEC SERVICES  
Deloitte & 
Touche






1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attention: ED 99-1
Re: Exposure Draft (ED 99-1): Certain Independence Implications of Audits of 
Mutual Funds and Related Entities
Dear Sirs:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on Independence Standards Board ("the ISB” or 
“the Board”) Exposure Draft (ED 99-1): Certain Independence Implications of Audits of 
Mutual Funds and Related Entities (“the ED”). The following paragraphs summarize our 
responses to the questions posed by the ISB in the ED and highlight additional ideas and 
concerns for the Board’s consideration.
General Comments
We applaud the ISB’s efforts to expeditiously provide guidance in the area of independence 
implications of audits of mutual funds. The corporate governance and legal structure of 
mutual funds and mutual fund complexes are unique and require thoughtful consideration in 
developing the independence standards related to auditors of mutual funds and related entities. 
The growth of investment in mutual funds has led to the creation of many large mutual fund 
complexes with significant numbers of funds and other related entities. Currently, as these 
entities meet their needs for independent audits, overly restrictive independence requirements 
could serve to unreasonably limit the number of audit firms available because of the likelihood 
of partners and employees being invested in funds within such complexes, in many cases 
through the firms’ defined contribution retirement plans.
Our general reaction to the ED is positive and we believe that it is based on an appropriate 
acknowledgement that the mutual fund industry is unique and that threats to independence are 
somewhat limited as a result. We believe that the ISB’s proposal is appropriately restrictive in 







• Investments in non-client sister funds by certain partners and managerial employees
• Participation of certain partners’ spouses and dependents in their employers’ retirement 
plans
• Extension of restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex.
Additionally, while we believe the costs of implementing the proposed standard appear to be 
modest, we suggest that the implications of noncompliance with the requirements may affect 
whether firms choose to permit flexibility permitted by the proposed standard in their internal 
policies with respect to non-client sister funds. Generally, we believe that the efforts to track 
and monitor such compliance could be complex and that firms will measure the trade-off 
between providing flexibility to their people with respect to personal investments and firm- 
sponsored plans and the firm’s ability to monitor compliance with such a standard.
We are hopeful that the ISB will timely complete its consideration of the independence 
implications of audits of mutual funds and related entities. We support the timely issuance of 
guidance that will be sufficiently restrictive to protect the public interest while not imposing 
restrictions where threats to independence are considered minimal.
Questions and Responses
Question 1:
The Board’s proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds by an expanded 
“on the engagement” group, in addition to all partners and managerial employees in offices 
participating in a significant portion of the audit. As a result, the proposal will permit 
investments in such other funds by all other partners. Is this proposal appropriate, too 
restrictive, or not restrictive enough? Please provide the basis for your views, including the 
applicable threats to independence.
Response
While we support the expanded “on the engagement” group approach, we do not agree that all 
partners and managerial employees in offices participating in a significant portion of the audit 
should be precluded from investing in non-client sister funds. Therefore, we believe the 
proposal is too restrictive in this area. First, we believe that the Board should consider an 
approach that would preclude only those partners and managerial employees that work in 
offices participating in a significant portion of the audit who might be reasonably expected to 





within offices by industry groups, the requirement might be modified to include only those 
partners and managerial employees in affected offices who serve in the firm’s financial 
services industry group or it’s mutual fund practice since they might be reasonably expected to 
work on the mutual fund audit or provide any other professional services to the mutual fund.
Second, we believe that the definition of chain of command is too broad. The proposal can be 
read currently to preclude all of a firm’s national office audit-related managers and partners 
from investing in non-client sister funds. We do not believe that all of the individuals in the 
national office who provide quality assurance or consultation functions should be restricted. 
Specifically, we believe that the limitation on investments in non-client sister funds should 
include only those partners who have management responsibility for the technical consultation 
or quality assurance functions and those managers or partners in the national office who 
provide any services to the client. Those that have sister fund investments could recuse 
themselves from participating in a consultation involving the fund complex.
Generally, we believe that partners and managerial employees in the engagement office but 
outside the engagement chain of command and industry group are unlikely to have any 
influence over the audit of a fund just as any partner outside the office. Therefore, there do not 
appear to be any additional threats to independence from permitting those individuals to invest 
in non-client sister funds given that those individuals would not be investing in an audit client 
of the firm. We believe such an approach would be preferable and would provide 
appropriately restrictive limitations on investments in non-client sister funds. We agree that 
the proposal is appropriately restrictive for other partners in the expanded “on the 
engagement” group.
Question 2:
A. As part of its reasoning in developing its sister fund proposal, the Board believes that the 
investment adviser/mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from the relationship 
of a parent and its subsidiary, as described in paragraph 16, to warrant only the restrictions 
proposed. Do you agree that these relationship differences are substantive enough to 
support the Board’s proposal? Or, do you believe that the investment advisers have strong 
enough operating control over, or financial interest relating to, the funds they advise to be 
more like a parent/subsidiary relationship, and therefore require additional independence 
restrictions and, if so, what restrictions do you suggest?
B. As described in paragraph 17, the Board concluded that the commonality of an investment 
adviser among funds was of primary importance in analyzing the sister fund issue, 
believing that the limited independence threats envisioned are appropriately addressed in 





different, if other common services are utilized, that additional independence restrictions 
should be required and, if so, why, and what restrictions do you suggest?
Response A
We agree that the investment advisor / mutual fund relationship is sufficiently different from 
the relationship between a parent and its subsidiary to warrant only the restrictions proposed in 
the ED. We believe additional independence restrictions are not necessary in light of the 
differences in such relationships.
Response B
We believe the limited independence threats are appropriately addressed in the ISB’s proposed 
restrictions. We believe the use of common service providers other than the investment 
advisor should not result in other restrictions because of the lack of threats with respect to the 
sister fund issue.
Question 3:
The independence requirements noted in the footnotes to paragraph 12 address extending 
restrictions beyond the original mutual fund complex for certain fund/adviser relationships. 
Do you believe these extensions are warranted and extend to the appropriate levels?
Response
In general, we believe the footnotes should be eliminated because we do not believe it is 
necessary to extend the requirements beyond the mutual fund complex. If the footnotes are 
retained, we do not believe that the inclusion of the sub-adviser in footnotes 1 and 2 is 
appropriate. A sub-adviser is not in the same position as the fund investment adviser to 
influence the operations of the fund since they are normally engaged solely at the discretion of 
the adviser. Further, with respect to the third bullet point in paragraph 12, we do not believe 
that restrictions should be extended to all non-fund entities under a parent that has multiple 
types of subsidiaries which do not provide any services to mutual funds within a mutual fund 
complex. Specifically, we do not believe that if a firm audits one or more funds, the audit firm 
and the individuals described in paragraph 12 should be required to be independent of all 
related non-fund entities in the mutual fund complex. Rather, we believe it would be more 
appropriate to require independence from those related non-fund entities in the mutual fund 
complex that are integral to the operations of the funds. For example, a parent of an 
investment adviser might also be the parent of a broker-dealer, a bank, or an insurance 





investment adviser has a relationship with the funds in the complex thereby requiring 
independence when auditing a fund, the broker-dealer, bank or insurance company clearly 
have no such relationships and are audited by another firm. There does not appear to be an 
independence threat that arises from individuals in the audit firm or the audit firm itself 
maintaining accounts, obtaining loans or having other financial relationships with those non­
integral entities.
If the footnotes are retained, we believe the extension in footnote 1 will be difficult to 
implement and overly burdensome since some advisers provide advisory services to many 
investment funds that are outside the mutual fund complex. Most of those situations involve 
circumstances where the adviser is merely acting as a service provider to another fund or 
entity that is sponsored by a separate entity, such as an insurance company separate account. 
Often the sponsoring entity has the power to terminate the advisory contract at any time. It 
does not appear to create an independence threat when the sponsoring entity and the fund are 
both audited by another firm. Therefore, we believe it is overly restrictive to include all funds 
outside the mutual fund complex that are clients of the investment adviser.
Question 4:
The Board’s proposed standard permits the audit firm to have self-directed defined 
contribution employee benefit plans (most typically, 401(k) plans) with non-client sister fund 
choices available to all but the engagement team, it’s chain of command, and certain others. 
Do you believe that the reasons described in paragraph 18 provide an appropriate basis for this 
distinction from direct investments and the firm’s defined benefit plans (which may not hold 
such funds)?
Response
We believe that the reasons described in paragraph 18 provide an appropriate basis for the 
distinction between direct investments by individuals and investments by the firm’s defined 
benefit plans.
Question 5:
The Board’s proposal permits spouses and dependents of partners, other than of the 
engagement team, its chain of command, and in a work office, to invest through an employee 
benefit plan in mutual funds that are audit clients. Do you agree that the threats to audit 
quality are sufficiently remote to support this exemption? Would it make a difference if the 
investment grew to an amount that is material to the partner?





We believe that similar threats to independence exist whether the partner or the partner’s 
spouse or dependents are permitted to invest in audit clients either directly or through 
employee benefit plans. We believe, however, that an individual’s ability to readily make or 
change investments within a defined contribution plan generally is significantly limited, either 
by regulation or plan provisions, and that these limitations mitigate independence concerns, 
especially when applied to spousal retirement plans. We also recognize that many companies 
offer only limited choices in defined contribution retirement plans and it could be difficult, if 
not impossible in some cases, for spouses to participate in benefit plans if greater latitude is 
not given in this regard. We believe the limited risks and threats warrant a slightly less 
restrictive approach in this area than that included in the proposal. Our proposed framework 
for investment restrictions involving spouses and dependents is described in Appendix 1.
Question 6:
The costs of implementing this proposed Independence Standard appear to be modest, while 
the benefits of a policy crisply focused on the areas of potential risk, but flexible in areas of 
negligible perceived risk, appears appropriate. Do you agree or disagree with this statement, 
and why? If you disagree, please offer your suggestions for change.
Response
We generally agree with the statement and believe that cost / benefit considerations should not 
prevent the Board from issuing the standard. We observe however, that in the largest firms 
with extensive and geographically diverse mutual fund practices, monitoring compliance with 
the standard could be complicated. For example, a firm with five or six mutual fund 
complexes in different cities would need to monitor which partners and managers within the 
firm could invest in certain sister funds. This is underscored by the fact that management level 
personnel in the firms are often relocated between offices. A farther complication arises when 
sister funds are offered in firm-sponsored defined contribution plans. We believe that in 
applying the standard firms may choose to implement more restrictive policies in order to 
protect themselves and their clients from risks of noncompliance. Firms often choose to 
simplify administration of independence policy as evidenced by definitions of “members’ that 
are more expansive than required by independence rules. We view such choices by the firms 
as just that and not as cost burdens that could prevent the Board from issuing the standard.





One of the ISB’s mandates is the use of original and archival research in the development of 
principles-based independence standards. Are you aware of any relevant research, either 
available or that you suggest be commissioned, on the specific topic of auditor independence 
with respect to mutual funds. If so, please advise us.
Response
We are unaware of any such studies or research. Further, we do not believe commissioning 
new research is sufficiently warranted to delay the completion of this project in light of the 
limited threats and risks that we believe have been adequately addressed.
*****
If you have any questions concerning our comments, please contact Robert J. Kueppers at 
(203) 761-3579, Richard M. Goligoski at (203) 761-3423, or Tracey C. Barber at (203) 761- 
3337.
Sincerely,
NOV-09-1999 16:28 SEC SERVICES  
November 9, 1999 
Independence Standards Board 
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APPENDIX 1
The following chart depicts our proposal for investment restrictions on partners’ spouses and 








partner on the audit 
engagement team
Spouse/dependent of 
partner or manager in the 
audit chain of command 
or in the audit 
engagement office but not 
on the engagement
Spouse/dependent of 
partner located outside the 
office and chain of 
command
Only choice is audit 
client
1 2 3
Only choice is sister fund 1 3 3
Options include audit 
client and sister funds
1 4 3
1. No investment in this benefit plan offering is permitted by the individuals in this group.
2. Investment in this benefit plan offering is permitted by the individuals in this group provided such 
investment would be immaterial to the partner or manager. This reflects treatment of this investment similar 
to an indirect financial interest
3. There would be no restrictions on investment in this benefit plan offering by the individuals in this group.
4. The spouse / dependant is permitted to direct investments to sister funds. Investments in audit client 
investment choices would not be permitted.
T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.
P.O. Box 89000
Baltimore, Maryland 21289-8600 
November 17, 1999










1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED99-1, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and 
Related Entities
Dear Mr. Allen:
We are submitting this comment on behalf of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc., a registered 
investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the T. Rowe Price family of 
over 75 mutual funds, all of which are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. As 
of September 30, 1999, the mutual funds had approximately $100 billion in assets. As public 
companies, T. Rowe Price Associates and the T. Rowe Price mutual funds (collectively “T. Rowe 
Price’) are required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and send to 
shareholders annual financial statements certified by independent public accountants. The above 
referenced proposals of the ISB are of significant importance to us.
T. Rowe Price fully supports and endorses the letter of comment submitted by the Investment 
Company Institute dated October 29, 1999. However, we wish to make two additional comments 
that have broad significance with respect to the independence standards themselves as well as 
their application and impact on investment companies and their advisers.
First, we fully agree with the ICI’s position that exceptions to the restrictions on prohibited 
investments should be granted to spouses and/or dependents of partners. More importantly, these 
exceptions should be extended to remote partners, i. e. those partners who are neither on the 
engagement team, in its chain of command or in an office participating in a significant portion of 
the audit. It makes little sense to impose the same investment restrictions on remote partners as 
are imposed on partners engaged directly or indirectly in the audit. Rule 17j-l under the 
Investment Company Act, which regulates personal securities transactions by investment 
company personnel, makes a similar distinction between “access persons” and other personnel of 
investment companies and advisers. Access persons are placed under significantly greater 
restrictions and reporting requirements than other persons not involved in the trading process and 
who do not have access to investment information. There is no need to subject a partner in an
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auditor’s Bangkok office to the same investment prohibitions imposed on personnel in the local 
office that performs the audit. We understand the need for a prophylactic rule in this area to deter 
undesirable conduct. However, any rule that is adopted must take into account the diversified and 
global nature of some of the very large accounting firms.
Second, we support the ICI’s position that there should be grace periods and materiality 
thresholds with respect to de minimis violations of the independence standards. However, we 
believe the ICI has not gone far enough. The ultimate issue with respect to any violation of an 
independence rule (other than violations cured by the application of the above proposed grace 
period or violations which are immaterial) is whether the audit that has been performed is valid. 
Stated another way, it is very likely that certain violations, even though they are serious within 
the context of the independence rule, do not in fact have any meaningful impact on the integrity 
of the audit. Under such circumstances, any sanction imposed should be limited to the individual 
and possibly the audit firm and not against the firm’s client by declaring the audit invalid. ISB 
standards do not effectively address this issue. In our view, there needs to be some practical 
mechanism to address the consequences of violations of an independence rule, whether the 
violation is a serious one or a minor one. As it stands now, it would appear that, at least in the 
view of the SEC, any violation of an independence rule automatically means that the auditors are 
not independent. This, in turn, raises a question as to the validity of the financial statements 
certified by that auditor. These issues could lead to draconian consequences that would fall most 
severely on the auditor’s client, who in all likelihood is completely innocent and unaware of any 
independence violations.
The solution in our view is for the client’s audit committee, comprised of independent directors, 
to review all violations of the independence standards and make a determination as to whether the 
auditors were in fact impaired, whether any impairment was likely to threaten the objectivity and 
integrity of the audit, and whether the audit must be redone or any other steps taken. This would 
be consistent with ISB Standard No.1, which effectively requires the audit committee to review 
the auditor’s independence, including all relationships between the auditor and the client, on an 
annual basis. If the audit committee is fully informed and makes a reasonable decision based on 
all information available to it, its decision should be binding and resolve the matter. The situation 
is similar to others involving public companies where difficult matters or conflicts of interest are 
referred to the board of directors for resolution. If the Board exercises its reasonable business 
judgment, the matter normally is resolved without further action.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you may have regarding this letter.
Henry H. Hopkpins 
Chief Legal Counsel
Forrest F. Foss
Associate Legal Counsel
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